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DO FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSITS DID THEY 
IMPROVE WELFARE? THE PERUVIAN CASE 1970-1985* 
Carlos A. Janada* 
ABSTRACT 
The Authorization of foreign currency deposits is interpreted here as a technological 
innovation reducing the demand for domestic money and improving welfare. The reduction of 
the inflation tax base leads to an increase of the inflation rate and of the associated excess-
burden. The final impact on Welfare is therefore ambiguous. An empirical estimation of the 
model for the Peruvian experience between 1970 and 1985 indicates that welfare actually 
improved when the government authorized foreign currency accounts. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Latin America has undertaken market-oriented reforms in the last few years. 
While some reforms - such as trade liberalization, privatization, and 
deregulation - have been unanimously implemented in the region, others such 
as financial liberal liberalization have been controversial. In particular, while 
some governments have allowed foreign currency deposits (e. G. Argentina, 
Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay), some others have been reluctant to approve 
such a policy (e. G., Colombia, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela). This paper 
attempts to assess the welfare impact of a foreign currency deposit policy 
based on the Peruvian experience between 1970 e 1985. 
The authorization of foreign currency deposits (FCDs henceforth) has two 
opposite effects on welfare. First, consent of these deposits implicitly legalizes 
the use of a foreign currency in daily transactions. Agents no longer have to 
resort to the black market to get foreign currency and pay high transaction 
costs. It is now available at any commercial bank or exchange house. Thus, 
ability to hold legally an extra currency has a positive impact on individuals' 
welfare. Second, often in these economies, fiscal revenues depend on 
government's ability to print money (seigniorage). The more the government 
uses seigniorage, the higher the inflation rate is. In this sense, the inflation rate 
acts as tax rate, while individuals' domestic money holdings function as the 
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base. The authorization of FCDs reduces the demand for domestic money. A 
decline of the tax base forces the government to increase the tax rate to keep 
constant its seigniorage revenues. As inflation rises, w/elfare decreases. 
In summary, on the one hand, the authorization of FCDs has a positive 
impact on individuals' welfare per se. On the other hand, the rise in the inflation 
rate has a negative impact. Thus, the welfare impact of an FCD policy is 
ambiguous on theoretical grounds. An empirical investigation becomes 
necessary to evaluate the final outcome. 
We use a theoretical framework developed by De Gregorio (1991) which 
show innovations in transaction technology affect welfare when government 
revenues depend on seigniorage. His paper concludes that if the inflation rate 
is close to zero, a technological innovation reducing transaction costs has a 
positive impact on welfare. However, if the inflation rate is close to the 
seigniorage maximizing rate, a technological innovation has a negative impact 
on individuals' welfare.^ If the inflation rate is in between, the theoretical impact 
is ambiguous and an empirical estimation of the model becomes necessary. 
We expand De Gregorio's model by using a more general specification of 
transaction cost technology. In particular, the transaction cost function used 
here depends not only on money but also on consumption. The authorization of 
FCDs is interpreted in this paper as an exogenous reduction in transaction 
costs (i.e., a technological improvement). The introduction of consumption and 
the adoption of a specific transaction technology make the model suitable for 
estimation purposes. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 contains the theoretical 
model. Section 3 presents the results of the empirical estimation of the model 
for the case of the Peru. The reduced form outlined in Section 2 is estimated 
using ordinary least squares and instrumental variables. The FCDs' welfare 
impact is assessed at the end of this section. Lastly, Section 4 offers some 
closing remarks. 
2. THE MODEL 
The model assumes that the economy consists of a representative infinitely 
lived agent who maximizes the following intertemporal utility function: 
W=ili'-'v{m,,xt) (1) 
It will be helpful to recall that seigniorage has a positive relationship with the inflation rate up to 
some point, right after which it becomes a negative one. This inverted V relationship is know in the 
literature as the Laffer's curve. This paper assumes that the government sets the inflation rate 
between zero and that maximizes seigniorage collection (seigniorage maximizing rate). 
with:^ v^>0 <0 
v^>0 v„rr,^0 v,„>0 (1.a) 
where m represents the individual's money holdings and x denotes his 
consumption. The parameter /3 is a subjective discount factor. As show by 
Feenstra (1986), it is possible to rewrite the utility function as: 
u{c) = v{x,m) (2) 
with: 
Uc>0 u^a^O (2.a) 
Where consumption (x) should be interpreted as the summation of net 
consumption (c) and transaction costs ( 0 ) . The following restrictions must also 
hold: 
(f){c,m)>0 (3) 
with: 0c ^ 0 (pcc^O 
<l>^<0 < 0 (3.a) 
The first partial derivatives indicate that transaction costs increase or 
remain constant with higher consumption and decrease or remain constant with 
higher money holdings. The second partial derivatives indicate a rising or 
constant marginal cost of consumption and a decreasing or constant marginal 
benefit of money. The cross derivative points out that higher money holdings 
bring about an unchanged or decreasing consumption marginal cost. 
Since we will allow for a technological change, it is convenient to reexpress 
(3) as: 
4)[c,m,Y)>0 (4) 
with: 
<l>y>0 <l>^y>0 <Pmr^O (4.a) 
y > 0 
where we have made explicit that the transaction cost function depends also on 
a technology parameter, y, such that, a technological progress (measured as a 
reduction in y) lowers, ceteris paribus, transaction costs. 
The representative agent maximizes (1) subject to the following budget 
constraint (capital letters stand for nominal variables): 
/ ( - , .D ,_ ,+P( .w , = P f . X ( + / W f - / W ( _ , + D f - D ( _ , V f =/,2,...,oo (5) 
^ To simplify notation we omit the time subscript "t" whenever possible. A subscript different from "t" 
indicates a partial derivate. 
where / is the nominal interest rate, P is the domestic price level, D is a non-
monetary assets, and w is the real wage. Assume for convenience, that Do and 
Mo are both equal to zero, and denote the price increase by k(Pi/Pt_i - i) and 
the real interest rate by r. If both r and n are constant, it is possible to 
reexpress the budget constraint (5) as: 
l i ^ * l ^ ^ - H (6) 
t^i[l + ry ^ t=i {l + rf 
with: 
1 + r t=i{l + r)'-^ 
We will refer to the term TT as the inflation rate. Substituting (2) into (1) and 
maximizing this result subject to (6) gives the following first order conditions: 
u, = A ( y + 0 , ) (7) 
(6) 
with: 
where X is the Lagrange multiplier. Equation (7) indicates that the marginal 
utility of consumption equals the marginal utility of income (X) multiplied by its 
price. The price of consumption equals its output cost plus the consumption 
marginal cost of the transaction technology. Equation (8) points out that in 
steady state the transaction technology money marginal cost must equal in 
absolute value the opportunity cost of holding money (i.e., the nominal interest 
rate). In other words, equation (8) is an demand implicit for money function. 
Since in steady state it is reasonable to assume that X = X*. then, from 
equation (6) and for a constant wage rate, we will have that for each period: 
c + (p + m. j—^w (10) 
Equation (10) says that, in steady state, the individual distributes its income 
among net consumption, transaction costs, interest forgone for holding money, 
and seigniorage paid to the government. We now proceed to analyze the net 
impact on welfare of an improvement in the technology transaction, in a 
situation where the government is required to collect a constant seigniorage. In 
steady state, real seigniorage for any period(s) is given by 
s = n- m (11) 
Since we are imposing the condition that real seigniorage remains constant 
after the technological change, then 
dy ~ m dy 
(12) 
Differentiating (8) and (10), and considering that in this case, the inflation 
rate changes to keep seigniorage constant, the solution to the resulting system 
in terms of dcfdy and dmjdy is given by 
dc_ 
dy 
dm 
dy 
with: 
r 
r ''my 
1 + r 
. (j)y 
m 
{l + <t>c)-4>y 
T = • 
1 + r ~ . {l + <l>c)-^n,c -{l + <Pc) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
In order to analyze the signs of expression (13) and (14), it will be useful to 
show how money demand changes when a technological innovation takes 
place, i.e.. 
dm 
dy 
'my ^ Vmc 
1 + i 
(16) 
Expression (16) indicates that there are two effects on money demand that 
run in opposite directions when a technological progress (measured by the first 
term on the right hand side of expression (16)). The second effect is the 
positive income effect on net consumption; since money demand depends 
positively on consumption (see expression (8)), money holdings rise due to this 
effect. Hence depending upon the relative strength of these effects, demand 
for money may go up or down as a result of a technological innovation. We will 
assume that the final outcome of a technological improvement will be a 
reduction in money demand, i.e.. 
(17) 
Furthermore, since we have assumed that the economy is always located 
on the upward sloping region of the Laffer's curve - i.e., seigniorage increases 
along with the inflation rate - it is possible to show that expression (15) is 
always negative except at the seigniorage maximizing inflation rate, when it 
becomes zero. 
Suppose that the inflation rate is zero. Then, using (15) and (17) in 
expressions (13) and (14), it can be shown that 
dc 
dr s=s(*=o)=o '^y 
>0 (18) 
s=s(^=O)=0 
On the other hand, it is feasible to show after some algebraical manipulation 
that the seigniorage maximizing inflation rate is given by 
^ ' " r ^ ^ A V m ^ {1 + r)l>mm (19) 
Replacing (19) in (13) and (14), it is possible to show that 
dc 
dy 
>0 ""^ 
S=S\K=K = s dy 
> 0 (20) 
Expression (18) indicates that a technological improvement will be welfare 
improving when the inflation rate is equal to zero. Intuitively. When the inflation 
rate is zero, the government does not collect any seigniorage at all. Thus, in 
spite of a reduction in money demand arising from the technological 
improvement, the inflation rate remains at zero. Thus, welfare necessarily 
improves. 
Expression (20) points out that the welfare impact will be negative when the 
inflation rate equals the seigniorage maximizing rate. In this case we have that 
previous to the technological innovation the government was maximizing 
seigniorage. The technological improvement reduces the demand for money, 
thus the government rises the inflation rate to keep seigniorage collection 
constant. However, as the government increases the inflation rate, demand for 
money falls even more. In this particular point, the government keeps rising the 
inflation rate in an attempt to keep its seigniorage collection constant. The 
welfare loss of an increasing inflation rate becomes higher (in absolute terms) 
than the positive welfare gain produced by the technological improvement. 
For any inflation rate between zero and the maximizing rate, the impact on 
welfare will be - in principle - ambiguous. However, since the utility function and 
the transaction technology are monotonic functions arguments, it is intuitively 
clear that the closer the inflation rate is to zero, the more likely that the impact 
on welfare is positive. On the other hand, the closer the inflation rate is to the 
seigniorage maximizing rate, the more likely that the impact is negative. 
In order to proceed with the empirical estimation of the model and clarify our 
theoretical findings, we adopt a particular transaction technology from which a 
Goldfeld-form demand for money can be devised. This specific technology is 
given by 
<l>{c,m,r)=^-l~ .er^' . +m+c-y'- - . c (21) 
7 - 0 m ' Y 
Taking into account (8), the state money demand function arising from 
expression (21) is 
In m = y + p. In c-5. In 
1 + r 
(22) 
Note that in this case the relevant scale variable of money demand is net 
consumption instead of income. Without further knowledge of the specific 
parameter values it is not possible to determine the sign of expression (13). A 
way of obtaining plausible values for the parameters involved in this expression 
is through the estimation of the money demand function with data form a given 
country. An alternative is to calibrate equations (13) and (14) for a given set of 
parameter values and different values of the inflation rate. This done in Figures 
1 and 2 for the following parameter set: p=1.80, y= -3.30, 5=3.40, and 
r=0.0075. These parameters are based on empirical estimates presented in the 
next section. 
Figure 1 shows that for low values of the in inflation rate, the final impact on 
welfare is positive. For rates close to the seigniorage maximizing inflation rate, 
the final outcome on welfare is negative, as was pointed out before. The 
seigniorage maximizing inflation rate is 38% and the inflation rate at which 
expression (13) changes its sign is 12%. Figure indicates that for any value of 
the inflation rate, this particular parameter set always exerts a negative effect 
on money demand. 
Figure 3 display the impact on welfare using the original and two alternative 
parameter sets in which we have only modified the value of the inflation 
elasticity of money demand (5). The figure shows the well known (inverse) 
relationship between the inflation elasticity of demand for money and the 
seigniorage maximizing inflation rate. 
Interestingly, it also shows that the higher the inflation elasticity, the more 
likely the impact on welfare arising from a technological change. In other 
words, a low seigniorage collection is in this context equivalent to a low inflation 
rate. 
Finally, this exercise suggests that empirical estimation of the model 
depicted above becomes crucial to evaluate the impact on welfare since the 
final outcome is highly sensitive to the value of the parameters. 
3. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION 
Technological innovation resulting in the decrease of transaction costs may 
take different forms, including the introduction of automatic teller machines or 
the introduction of credit cards. Indeed, these innovations tend not only to 
reduce transaction costs, but also to prompt individuals to keep less money in 
their pockets and checking accounts. The technological innovation that took 
place in Peru was the authorization of FCDs. 
In particular, the government allowed commercial banks to offer foreign 
currency checking accounts.^ The government also permitted commercial 
banks to issue certificate of deposits denominated in foreign currency. These 
certificates were freely negotiable and highly liquid to make transactions. In 
addition, the government eliminates some exchange controls, authorized the 
establishment of exchange houses, and allowed citizens to satisfy contracts 
with foreign exchange. This liberalization may have reduced the demand for 
domestic money, affecting the ability of the authorities to collect seigniorage. 
We have already established that the welfare impact of reduced transaction 
costs is unambiguous when the inflation rate is zero (positive impact) or when it 
maximizes seigniorage collection (negative impact). However, the seigniorage 
maximizing inflation rate is hardly known without an empirical estimate of 
demand for money. During the period analyzed, inflation in Peru was not close 
to zero and the seigniorage collected by the government increased pari passu 
the inflation rates. This suggests that the inflation rate was between the two 
extremes and, therefore, we need an empirical approach to evaluate the 
welfare impact of FCDs authorization. 
Note that the money function is estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and instrumental variables (IV). The estimation period extends from the 
third quarter of 1970 to second quarter of 1985 (60 quarterly observations). We 
measure the impact of the authorization of FCDs (made in December 1977) on 
the demand for money through a dummy variable. The dummy viable shifts the 
value of the constant term between the two periods (1970-Q3/1977-Q4 and 
1978-Q1/1985-Q2). 
A conventional assumption of econometric estimations is that the time 
series employed are stationary. However, recent developments in applied 
research have shown that several economic time series traditionally used in 
econometric estimations might have unit roots. Given that the existence of unit 
roots has serious implications for the validity of regression analysis results (the 
spurious regression problem), this assumption must not be taken for granted 
^ Even though the government authorized commercial banks to deal with several foreign currencies, 
banks chose the American dollar as the leading foreign currency in their operations. 
and more attention should be paid to the appropriate econometric technique in 
the presence of non-stationary time series. In particular, time series with unit 
roots that are postulated to be linearly related can be estimated through the co-
integration technique. We carry out the estimation of expression (22), i.e., 
demand for money, using OLS and IV and then test for cointegration. 
The first step in the co-integration methodology is to determine whether the 
time series that are postulated to be linearly related are integrated of order 
one. The second step is to run a regression using the integrated series. This 
linear combination is generally a long run relationship that in principle should 
come from economic theory. Finally, one should test for co-integration in the 
residual vector of the last regression. 
3.1 Testing for unit roots 
There are different techniques to test whether a time series is stationary. 
We have adopted one of the most commonly used in the literature. Dickey-
Fuller test. This test was applied to the following series: the logarithm of per 
capita money holdings (log m), the logarithm of per capita consumption (log c), 
and the inflation rate (n)." See the appendix for data sources and definitions. 
The methodology used to evaluate the unit root tests is the one outlined in 
Perron (1988). Table 1 displays our empirical findings. If K (the truncation lag 
parameter) equals zero, we have the simple Dickey-Fuller test. This test 
assumes that the residual term in the regression is i.i.d., if k is positive, we 
have the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. This test is a parametric way to deal 
with the likely autocorrelation of the error term. 
We use the statistics /?(p - / ) , i , and to evaluate whether there is 
evidence for rejecting the null hypothesis Ho of a unit root. ^ The results show 
that only case where Ho is rejected is in the inflation case at 5% of significance. 
However, rejection of Ho might be due to the poor power properties of this test. 
A more powerful test might be carried out by ignoring the trend variable, but we 
first have to verify whether the drift is zero. The Ho for the statistic 02 is that 
the time series has a unit root and is driftless; the Ho is accepted for the series 
of money, consumption, and the inflation rate (when k= 1 and 3). 
* The inflation rate for the unit root test was defined as 71 = Pt/Pt-t -1 • However, we refer to 
n = 
5 
n/{l + tt) as the inflation rate elsewhere in this paper 
Dickey and Fuller have shown that under Ho, t distribution is strongly skewed to the left. Thus, the t 
distribution is a bad approximation in this case. However, the estimation of p is still feasible by simply 
applying OLS, the critical values for these statistics have been tabulated by Dickey and Fuller. 
Table II shows the results when we ignore the trend variable, the Ho for is 
that there is a unit root. Note that in the case of money, Ho is rejected for k=0. 
This was precisely the case for which Ho for the statistic 02was rejected. 
However, when we consider that the error term is likely to be auto-correlated, 
the results in Table II suggest that per capita money holdings, per capita 
consumption, and the inflation rate follow a random walk without drift. 
In brief, the Dickey-Fuller tests suggest that the unit root hypothesis can not 
be discarded in the money and consumption series. However, the evidence is 
not conclusive for the inflation rate is our sample period.^ 
3.2 Specification, estimation and co-integration 
The long run relantionship to be estimated is the demand for money 
specified in (22). For estimation purposes, this equation may be rewritten as 
/n mj = y0 + 7^ d?, + 72 . d2( + ^ . In Cj - 5 In 
with: 
1 + r + rct+1 
1 + r 
+ Uf (22.a) 
' i^tt ' ~ P,-i 
where Ut is the residual term and d1t an d2t are two dummy variables. The first 
one accounts for the technological change (it takes the value of since 1978, 
zero elsewhere). The second one, for the unexpected increase in the money 
supply due to foreign factors.'' Since the interest rates on deposits were under 
government control and Peru's stock market was underdevelopment, it as 
difficult to obtain information on the return on capital (r). We assumed a fix real 
return of 3% per annum to perform the estimation (22.a). The co-integration 
methodology requires that all series entering the regression be integrated of 
order one, I (1). Since the only series for which the unit root tests are not 
conclusive with respect to its non-stationary is the inflation rate, it will be 
assumed that the inflation rate is 1(1).^ 
^ We found similar results using the Philips-Perron non-parametric test. We also carried showed the 
results showed no evidence of unit roots. 
^ It takes the value if one for 1979 and 1980, zero elsewhere. The country's terms of trade increased 
substantially during these years. Since Peruvian exports depend heavily on raw materials, the 
improvement in the country's terms of trade resulted in a quick monetization of inflows. 
* Zambrano-Berendsohn (1992) found in his study on Peruvian demand for money that the inflation 
rate did have a unit root. His sample covered the period 1979-1988. 
The estimated parameters are displayed in Table HI for both OLS and IV.® 
Most of the parameters are significant at the usual 95% degree of confidence. 
The sign of y , is negative in both cases as expected on theoretical grounds; 
these results indicate an exogenous reduction in demand for money between 
15,3% and 19,5% when FCDs were introduced in 1978. The sudden impact on 
money supply due to foreign factors increased demand for money temporarily 
by 19%, approximately. The adjusted and the standard error of the 
regression, a , indicate a relatively good adjustment in both cases. The low D-
W statistic might indicate either that the error term is auto correlated, the 
functional form of (22) is incorrect, or there are missing variables. We will use 
this to test for co-integration.^° 
With the estimated residual term ( ) of each regression, we proceed to test 
for co-integration. The null hypothesis Ho is that the residual term is non-
stationary. Rejection of Ho means that the long run relationship is stable over 
time. Failure to reject Ho indicates that the relationship might be meaningless. 
Egle and Granger (1987) suggest several methods to test for co-integration. A 
quick check, though, not recommended by these authors, is to examine the D-
W statistic. They show that if the residual term from the regression is non-
stationary, then D-W statistic converges to zero.'^ The critical value for the co-
integrating D-W statistic is 0.367 at the 5% level of significance see Granger 
and Newbold (1986, p.264). According to this test, we reject Ho in all cases. 
Thus, the co-integrating D-W statistic suggests that the estimated relationships 
are stable over time. 
A more elaborated test is the augmented Dickey-Fuller. The relevant 
regressions to carry out this test are shown in Table IV. The critical value for 
the t test on the level of the lag variable is 3.13 (see Granger and Newbold 
(1986, p.264)). hence, at the 5% level of significance, we reject the null 
hypothesis for the co-integrating regression (22.a), i. E., the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller strongly indicates that the relationship (22.a) is co-integrated. 
' The instuments used were past values of per capita GDP, real money stock, inflation rate, and 
devaluation rate. 
We have also examined with the estimated parameters that conditions (3.a) and (4.a) hold. We 
used average values of consumption and money holdings for the following periods: 1970-Q3/1977-
Q4, 1978-Q1/1978-Q4, 1979-Q1/1980-Q4, and 1981-Q1/1985-Q1. 
' ' They have tabulated the critical values for the co-integrating D-W when the number of series in the 
regression is two and they are all random walks or ARIMA (4, 1, 0). Granger and Newbold (1986) 
have extend the number of series in the regression to three and for the case of random walks only. 
3.3 Welfare evaluation 
Since the Peruvian government authorized FCDs in December 1977, 
welfare evaluation was carried out with averages values of consumption, 
money holdings, and inflation rates for the period 1970-Q3/1977-Q4. The 
evaluation of expression (13) and (14) using the parameter set estimated for 
(22.a) is reported in Table V. The results indicate that although the introduction 
of FCDs had a negative impact on demand for money, it actually improved 
individual's welfare. This table also reports the seigniorage maximizing inflation 
rate (^*).^^ Table VI reports the estimated values for expressions (13) and 
(14) using the parameters estimated with OLS for different levels of the 
inflation rate. The average inflation rate for the period 1970-Q3/1977-04 was 
only 4.57%. Thus, the economy was relatively far from the seigniorage 
maximizing rate when FCDs were introduced. 
After the introduction of FCDs, the rate should have increased to 5.80% 
(5.53% using IV estimators) to keep seigniorage revenues constant. However, 
the average inflation rate for the second period (once FCDs were introduced) 
rose to 14.91%, i. e., the Peruvian government used more intensively 
inflationary finance. The modification of the exchange rate regime played a key 
role in this outcome. The government switched from a fixed exchange rate to a 
crawling peg almost simultaneously to the introduction of FCDs. This change 
allowed government to set up a higher rate than the international one. Even 
though the average inflation rate for the second period was still far from the 
seigniorage maximizing rate, i. e., below 30%, it should be pointed out that the 
inflation rate for the first two quarters of 1985 were 25.0% and 26.3%, 
respectively. 
The model developed above indicates the direction of change in individual's 
welfare arising from a technological innovation and a simultaneous increase of 
the inflation rate in the steady state. However, two particular issues no treated 
do far arise when this model is applied to the Peruvian experience with FCDs. 
First, the FCDs policy was carried out for a limited period of time (92 months). 
Second, the government imposed a special one time capital levy on these 
deposits in 1985. A more accurate measurement of the welfare impact due to 
the FCDs policy must take into consideration these issues. 
The first issue would have been irrelevant if the second one had not 
occurred. It is possible to find from equation (13) the change in individual's 
consumption per period arising from the introduction of FCDs and the 
simultaneous increase of the inflation rate. The present value of this additional 
Note that the estimation of the seigniorage maximizing implicitly assumes constancy of the 
elasticities in demand for money. 
consumption stream represents individual's long term welfare gain. Since the 
change in consumption is the same for any period and in the absence of any 
taxation, individual's long term welfare gain will be positive if and only if his 
change of consumption per period is also positive. This assertion is 
independent of the number of periods. However, the magnitude of the long 
term welfare gain will vary according to the number of periods. 
The second issue is more subtle. The freezing of the FCDs in 1985 marked 
the end of the FCDs policy. Furthermore, depositors paid a special one time 
capital levy. The government froze the FCDs in July 1985. The freezing was 
done in terms of dollars. Residents could withdraw their FCDs at an exchange 
rate of I/. 13.94 per U.S. Dollar plus a premium of 3%, i. e., an effective 
exchange rate of I/, 14.36 (lower than the market exchange rate of I/. 17.38), 
Assuming that residents withdrew the equivalent of their FCDs in domestic 
currency right after freezing, the implicit tax rate they paid amounted to 17.4% 
[(17.38 - 13.94 * 1.03)/17.38]. Since we have empirically estimated the change 
in the technological parameters, y, it is possible to estimate from equation (13) 
the change in individual's consumption per period. Numerical evaluation of the 
integral of equation (13) using the OLS estimators found for the Goldfeld-type 
technology yields; dc = 0.1370. This value represents 0.42% of individual's 
consumption on an annual basis, approximately.^^ Therefore, the introduction 
of FCDs had a positive effect on individual's welfare equivalent to an increase 
of this consumption in 0.42%. It should be emphasized that this is a flow result. 
If FCDs had not been banned from the economy and there had not been a 
capital levy on these accounts, the individual's long term welfare gain would 
have been 14.24% (percentage of individual's consumption).^'' 
However, FCDs in Peru lasted a limited period of time and they were 
subject to a special taxation. Thus, individual's long term welfare gain was 
obviously lower than the 14.24% estimated above. An attempt to evaluate 
individual's long term welfare gain once we consider the issues mentioned 
above is presented in Table VII. The second column of this table reports the 
cumulated welfare gain when taxation of FCDs is initially omitted. This indicator 
was only one fifth of its long term value by July 1985. The imposition of the tax 
reduced the cumulated welfare gain to the level it had in early 1980.'^ All in all, 
The quarterly average real per capita consumption betw/een 1970-Q3 and 1977-Q4 was 1/32 42 
(intis of 1979), This amount represented annual real per capita consumption of 1/ 129,68 The latter 
amount is used as a benchmark in the results presented in Table VII, The numerical evaluation of the 
integral equation (13) using the IV estimators yields a slightly higher result, 
^* This was estimated as (4 * 0,1370 / 129 68 = 0 42%) / 0 03, 
The welfare gain considering taxation was estimated as follows The implicit tax rate, 17,4%, was 
applied on real per capita FCDs at the end of July 1985, 1/ 17 29 (intis of 1979), This result was then 
taken to present value in 1977 using the 3% real interest rate as a discount factor We finally 
the average Peruvian depositor was better off with the authorization of FCDs in 
spite of their subsequent taxation. 
4. FINAL REMARKS 
This paper has analyzed the welfare implications of authorizing FCDs in the 
domestic financial system, assuming that they represent a change in the 
steady state transaction technology. The estimation of the model for the 
Peruvian experience indicates that the average individual's welfare improved 
when the government introduced foreign currency accounts in December 1977. 
Note that this result holds in spite of the subsequent taxation imposed on these 
accounts in July 1985. 
Our results suggest the financial innovations, at least in the Peruvian case, 
may have sizable effects on individuals' welfare in the long run. Indeed, our 
findings indicate that per capita consumption would have increased 14.2% in 
the long term if FCDs had not been banned from the economy. 
Finally, our results also indicate that the seigniorage maximizing inflation 
rate was between 30% and 33% per quarter. This result proved to be robust. 
Seigniorage revenue increased until rnid-1988, when the domestic inflation rate 
surpassed the 33% boundary. Thereafter, seigniorage collection decreased 
substantially as inflation kept increasing. 
APPENDIX A: DATA, SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS 
All data were obtained from the Banco Central de Reserva del Peru and the 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática. None of these series was 
corrected for seasonality. A brief description of each series is as follows. 
- m (per capita money holdings); Money is the summation of currency and 
demand deposits from the Peruvian banking system. We obtained first a 
quarterly average of (nominal) monthly observations. Then, we deflated the 
series by the quarterly average consumer price index. Finally, the deflated 
series was divided by the population to express it in per capita terms. 
- c (per capita consumption); The Central Bank has a quarterly series of real 
private consumption since 1979. This series is available on a yearly basis prior 
to this date. We applied a procedure developed by Fair (1984, p. 453) to create 
subtracted this result from the welfare gain without taxation (estimated until July 1986)and expressed 
if in percentage of per capita consumption Note that our estimations implicitly assume that Peruvian 
depositors did not anticipate the imposition of the tax levy on FCDs. If the had done so, FCDs would 
have declined substantially days before the imposition of the tax. FCDs reached an all time historical 
record in January 1985 ($1 73 billion) They decreased steadily a f terward and were $1.37 billion in 
July 1985. 
quarterly data from annual observations for the period 1970-1978. Finally, we 
divided the quarterly series by the population. 
- 71 (inflation rate): We estimated it using the relative change of the quarterly 
average of Lima's consumer price index (1979=100). 
- Population: The Instituto Nacional de Estadística has published projections 
of Peru's annual population in the 1970's and 1980's. We used an interpolation 
method to transform this series from a yearly to a quarterly frequency. 
APPENDIX B - TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1. Dickey- Fuller unit root test 
Y, = « + /3 . - 4 
k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 
Real per capita money {log m) 
- p 0.9472 09358 0,9347 0,9267 0.8953 
-n{p-l) -03.11 -0373 -03,72 -04 10 -05.76 
~ r -01.37 -01 68 -01,65 -01,73 -02,40 
06.68* 03.52 04,18 03,73 03 54 
-1>3 04.76 03.15 03,72 03.53 04,16 
Real per capita consumption {log c) 
- p 0.9072 0.8961 08848 0.8733 08526 
-n{p-1) -05,48 -0602 -06 56 -07.10 -08,11 
- f -01 91 -02.05 -02,16 -02.25 -02,47 
01,68 01-81 02,01 02 13 02.39 
-t>3 02.51 02.71 03,02 03 20 03,59 
Inflation rate 
- p 0,3022 0,2955 0 0309 0,2163 -0 1226 
-n{p-l) -41-17- -40 68* -55,24* -4389* -61,74* 
- f -04,91* -03,40 -0398* -02,66 -03,47 
-<I>2 08-77* 05.12 06,65* 04 27 05,71* 
-•I'3 1248* 06 52 08,71* 04,33 06 82* 
Note: Reject Ho at the 5% level of significance. 
Critical Values: 
1 % 5% 10% 
-n(p-l) -2570 -19.80 -16.80 
- f -04 15 -03,50 -03,18 
-<1>2 07,02 05,13 04,31 
-i>3 09,31 06,73 05.61 
Sources: Fuller (1976) and Dickey and Fuller (1981) 
Table 2: Dickey- Fuller unit root test 
Vf = a + p. y , . i -1-
=1 
-i) + et 
k=0 k=1 _ k=2 _ k=3 k=4 
Real pet capita money tofif m) 
1.0314 1.0158 1.0214 1 0195 1.0080 
-n{p-l) 01.85 00.92 01.22 01 09 00.44 
- f 01.86 00,93 01 22 01 05 00.40 
06.58* 02.41 03.08 0242 01.08 
Real per capita consumption {log c) 
-P 0,9381 0.9313 0,9275 0.9234 0.9092 
-n{p-l) -03.65 -03.98 -04.13 -04 29 -05 00 
- r -01 34 -01 44 -01.46 -01 47 -01.66 
00,90 01.04 01,06 01,08 01.38 
Inflation rate (n) 
-p 0,9001 0.9917 0.9949 1 0388 1,0299 
-n(p-l) -05 89* -00.48 -00.29 02 18 01,64 
~ f -01.28* -00 10 -0.06 00,45 00,33 
01.30 00.98 00.96 01.91 01,45 
Note- Reject Ho at the 5% level of significance. 
Critical Values: 
1% 5% 10% 
-n{p-l) -18.90 -1330 -10.70 
- f -03.58 -0298 -02.60 
07,60 04.86 03.94 
Sources- Fuller (1976) and Dickey and Fuller (1981) 
Table 3: Demand for money estimations 
1970-Q3/1985-Q1 (50 observations) 
Parameters' OLS 
Equation (22.a) 
IV 
Yo 
Yi 
Y2 
P 
5 
R= 
<T 
D-W 
-2.9565 
(0 9834) 
-0.1951 
(0.0733) 
0,1994 
(0.0559) 
1.7757 
(02849) 
3,7735 
(0.5294) 
0.8882 
0.1279 
1.3023 
•3.1916 
(1 0126) 
-0.1531 
(0.0761) 
0 1878 
(0.0564) 
1.8486 
(02934) 
4.1370 
(0.5616) 
08872 
0.1284 
1.4483 
Note-' Standard errors of the estirtiated parameters are show in parenthesis 
Table 4: Co-Integration estimations 1971-Q4/1985-Q1 (54 observations) 
Equation (22.a) 
Estimated residuals from 
parameters^ 
OLS IV 
/34 
a 
D-w 
-0.6313 
(0.1235) 
0,2941 
(0.1109) 
0,4010 
0,1138 
1.8261 
-0 6863 
(0.1263) 
0.3006 
(0,1079) 
0,4413 
0,1164 
1,8401 
Note:" Standard errors of the estinnated parameters are show in parenthesis 
Table 5: Welfare evaluation 
OLS IV 
dc -0,35 -0,80 
dy s 
dm 24,20 24,05 
dy s 
33,13% 29,50% 
Revenue maximizing rate l;r 
Table 6; Changes in consumption and demand for money 
dc dm 
dy s dy s 
01 -0,41 23.82 
02 -0,41 23.87 
03 -0,39 23.95 
04 -038 24.07 
05 -0.35 2422 
06 -0.32 2441 
07 -029 24,65 
08 -024 24,93 
09 -0.19 2526 
10 -0,13 25,65 
11 -006 26,10 
12 002 2662 
13 O i l 27 22 
14 0 22 27,91 
15 034 2870 
20 1,32 34,98 
30 13.97 116 41 
33 417.28 2712,81 
Table 7: Long term welfare gain (%^) 
Without taxation With taxation 
1977-1980 1,21 
1977-1981 1.59 
1977-1982 1.96 
1977-1983 2.31 
1977-1984 2.66 
1977-1985 (March) 2.75 
1977-1985 (June) 283 
1977-1985 (July) 2.86 1.01 
1977-~ 14.24 
Figure 1: The final effect on welfare 
cfc 
dy 
Figure 2: The final effect on demand for money 
dm 
Figure 3: Alternative parameter sets 
dc_ 
5=3 60 8=3 40 3=3.25 
.- '16 36 38 
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SINOPSE 
OS DEPÓSITOS EM MOEDA ESTRANGEIRA 
AUMENTAM O BEM-ESTAR? O CASO PERUANO, 1970-1985 
A autorização para depósitos em moeda estrangeira é interpretada aquí como uma inovação 
tecnológica, reduzindo a demanda por moeda doméstica e aumentando o bem-estar. A redução 
da base do imposto inflacionário leva a um aumento da taxa de inflação e do superávit 
orçamentário associado. O impacto final sobre o bem-estar é portanto ambiguo. Uma estimação 
empírica do modelo para a experiência peruana, entre 1970 e 1985, indica que o bem-estar 
realmente aumentou quando o governo autorizou a abertura de contas em moeda estrangeira. 
